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In 1991, using a combination of 
powerful magnets and “sewer pipe, 
wire, epoxy, and finger tapping,” a 
small number of research groups 
converged on the idea of capitalizing 
on the magnetic resonance properties 
of gray matter to image the active, 
thinking human brain — an approach 
now known as functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) [1]. 
Cognitive neuroscience has since 
developed at a pace that could 
scarcely be imagined given these 
humble origins, and the ensuing 
two decades have witnessed an 
explosion of ingenious techniques 
and sophisticated tools. Each new 
advance in brain imaging is greeted 
with a chorus of speculation about its 
potential application to other arenas 
of human endeavor. 
Discussions about the ‘promise of 
neuroscience’ are often tinged with 
a particular mixture of anxious hope 
and desperate fear. Nowhere is this 
more evident than in the courts. In 
both popular media and scholarly 
publications, there has been much 
excitement about the impact that 
cognitive neuroscience might have 
on legal cases. This discussion is rife 
with speculation, centered on the 
notion that neuroscience holds the 
promise of detecting liars, objectively 
determining criminal responsibility, 
quantifying suffering and predicting 
violence. We argue that the discourse 
about ‘neurolaw’ often sheds more 
heat than light, as these promises elide 
a fundamental and perilous chasm 
between the aims and methods of 
scientific research and how courts might 
use that research. The relationship 
between neuroscience and law is 
fraught with fundamental differences, 
the implications of which we are only 
beginning to understand (Figure 1). 
Here, we attempt to reconcile the 
promises made for neuroscience 
and law with the inferential limits 
overcoming these challenges are offeredof neuroscientific data. We will 
outline three significant domains 
of engagement between law and 
neuroscience, and will enumerate 
several inferential challenges that 
confound the scientific validity of 
neuroscientific evidence. Finally, we 
offer recommendations for enhancing 
the ability of neuroscience to validly 
render assistance to the courts.
Three domains of engagement 
Mental states
The administration of law could 
not exist without mind reading, as 
mental state inference is central 
to legal decision-making [2]. 
Punishment for a wrongful act 
hinges on a determination of moral 
blameworthiness (in criminal contexts) 
or liability (in the law of torts). Such 
determinations require inferences 
about the beliefs, intentions and 
motivations of the individual being 
considered for sanction [3]. This 
need for accurate information about 
the content of another’s mind has 
long vexed legal decision-makers, 
who rely on the predictably fallible 
interpolation of testimony and 
circumstance for measuring mental 
states. Some have argued that by 
virtue of its potential to break open 
the black box of the human mind, 
neuroscience appears to some 
uniquely suited to enhance the legal 
system by improving the accuracy 
of such inferences [4]. Indeed, there 
has been much speculation about the 
ability of neuroscientific tools, chiefly, 
brain imaging, to finally render in 
clear, quantitative and incontrovertible 
focus the beliefs, motives, intentions, 
memories and subjective experiences 
of other people [5,6]. Mental states 
judgments therefore represent a 
key zone of engagement between 
neuroscience and law.
Consider the following scenario: 
John is out for a drive in his new car, 
when an unknown and unforeseeable 
mechanical failure causes the car 
to lurch suddenly onto the adjacent 
. sidewalk and into a bus shelter, 
fatally wounding another person. How 
blameworthy is John for the injury? 
How much punishment does he 
deserve? Now consider an alternative 
scenario: Steve is out for a drive in his 
new car, when he spies his ex-wife’s 
new boyfriend waiting for a bus. 
He has threatened to kill this man 
before, and proceeds to make good 
on that threat. Gripping the wheel, he 
lurches the car directly into the bus 
shelter killing the boyfriend. Is Steve 
more blameworthy than John for the 
man’s death? Does he deserve more 
punishment? The modal answer to 
each question is, far and away, ‘yes’. 
This exercise illustrates an age-old 
legal principle, encapsulated in the 
phrase “actus non facit reum nisi 
mens sit rea”, meaning, ‘an act is 
not guilty unless the mind is guilty’. 
While this principle is, of course, 
considerably more complicated and 
nuanced in practice, its basic logic 
applies across most legal settings. 
Criminal law codes enumerate a vast 
multitude of proscribed behaviors, 
but merely committing one of these 
prohibited acts (actus rea) is usually 
not enough alone to merit punishment. 
In the law, blameworthiness is 
judged also by the mental state that 
accompanied the bad act. Blame is 
thus accorded by a combination of 
the act and the intention, with criminal 
sanctions measured by the severity 
of the deed and the guilty mind that 
accompanied it (mens rea, meaning, 
literally, “guilty mind”). 
In the two scenarios above, 
we are tasked with comparing 
blameworthiness and deserved 
punishment for an identical harm, 
but which followed in one case 
from a ‘pure’ accident, and in the 
other from an explicit intention to 
kill. If mental state inferences were 
as straightforward as this, the job 
of legal decision-makers would 
be considerably easier. The law 
recognizes that ‘intent is not as cut 
and dry as accident vs. non-accident, 
and distinguishes between several 
distinct mental states when evaluating 
blameworthiness. For example, the 
American Law Institute’s model penal 
code defines four hierarchical levels 
of culpability (purposeful, knowing, 
reckless, negligent) in relation to three 
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Figure 1. Perils at the interface of neurosci-
ence and law.
These perils stem, in part, from a discon-
nect between law’s desires for neuroscience 
(what law wants neuroscience to do), un-
constrained speculation about the ‘promise’ 
of neuroscience (what commenters claim 
neuroscience could do), and the actual in-
ferential limitations of neuroscientific data 
for legal contexts (what neuroscience can 
actually do).specific objective criteria (conduct 
elements, result elements, attendant 
circumstances). The blameworthiness 
of a defendant, and hence his or 
her deserved punishment, varies 
according to these four levels of 
intent, though the extent to which 
lay people — and thus, jurors — can 
meaningfully distinguish between 
these legally distinct mental states has 
been questioned [7]. Blameworthiness 
is also affected by the presence 
of mitigating circumstances (such 
as duress) that bear directly on a 
defendant’s mental state, and their 
capacity to form a specific level of 
intent. 
So far, enthusiasm for neuroscience 
as it pertains to mental states has 
focused on providing support for 
insanity defenses at the guilt phase 
of trials, or as mitigating evidence 
during the penalty phase in capital 
cases. While rarely successful at the 
guilt stage, brain imaging evidence 
has been credited with reducing 
sentences at the penalty phase [8]. 
More generally, the introduction of 
brain imaging evidence has, to date, 
run the gamut of legal contexts: 
“everything from competence to waive 
Miranda rights, subjective experience 
of pain in tort cases, custody 
determinations, mens rea defenses 
for fraud, kidnapping, burglary, and 
even murder” according to Brown and 
Murphy’s exhaustive review [9].
Mental state judgments are not 
restricted to questions of intent and blameworthiness. Whether 
conscious and deliberate or hidden 
and automatic, bias represents a 
serious threat to the administration 
of justice. The ability to objectively 
measure bias, especially in potential 
jurors, is something of a holy grail 
for jury and trial consultants. Race 
bias, in particular, has been well 
studied in social psychology, and 
there have been several reports of 
neural signatures for such biases [10]. 
Indeed, one recent study observed 
that brain activity during a race bias 
task was positively correlated with 
the amount of money the subjects 
awarded victims in a hypothetical 
employment discrimination case [11]. 
The “promise” of neuroscience in this 
area is the provision of an objective 
metric for determining bias in legal 
decision-makers and legal actors. 
The mental state of ‘suffering’ 
is often at issue in civil law. The 
magnitude of compensatory damages 
awarded to a plaintiff hinges, in 
part, on the amount of physical 
and emotional harm caused by a 
defendant. While some physical 
harms do not require extensive 
empirical verification (e.g. loss of 
limbs, extensive burns), other forms 
of physical injury (e.g. chronic pain) 
are more challenging to quantify. 
Furthermore, emotional harm (i.e. 
mental suffering and emotional 
distress) is often treated as a 
secondary consideration because of 
the difficulty in obtaining objective, 
quantitative measures of these mental 
states. Courts are frequently caught 
between the Scylla of real-but-
unverifiable pain and the Charybdis 
of malingering. Hence, many legal 
scholars have greeted the discovery 
of intensity-dependent, regionally 
specific brain-imaging correlates of 
pain experience with great interest. 
As one example, Adam Kolber 
has suggested that “neuroimaging 
may, in the not-too-distant future, 
supplement our evaluations of pain 
claims by supporting genuine claims 
or, possibly, impugning malingered 
ones and provide increasingly 
objective methods of assessing 
the severity of a person’s pain and 
comparing that to the pain of other 
people” [12].
Self-control
The second domain of engagement 
for law and neuroscience relates to 
self-control. The issue of ‘self-control’ or ‘volitional control pervades the 
American criminal and quasi-
criminal (i.e., civil commitment and 
sex-offender registration regimes) 
justice systems. An individual’s 
ability to control his or her behavior 
is central to many legal decisions, 
often as a component of assessing 
the culpability of past acts. Criminal 
liability is premised on the notion that 
people are in control of their actions. 
Thus, a choice to commit harm, or to 
engage in conduct that leads to harm, 
is considered just that, a choice. 
Liability implies that when an agent 
selects an action that results in harm, 
there were other actions available 
and — like any other person in the 
same circumstance — he or she 
had the ability to choose otherwise, 
but did not. Highlighting the idea 
that the capacity for self-control is 
a cornerstone of criminal liability, 
philosopher of law Michael Moore 
wrote: “We are responsible for wrongs 
we freely choose to do, and not 
responsible for wrongs we lacked the 
freedom (capacity and opportunity) to 
avoid doing” [13]. 
The neuroscience of self-control 
capacity has affected legal practice 
and policy in two ways. First, brain 
imaging and neurogenetic evidence 
has been introduced during the 
sentencing phase of capital cases 
as mitigating evidence to support a 
claim of volitional impairment. For 
example, fMRI evidence was used to 
support the claim that Brian Dugan, 
convicted of raping and murdering 
a 10-year-old girl, was unable to 
control his behavior. Similarly, an 
Italian court reduced the sentence 
of convicted murderer Abdelmalek 
Bayout after hearing evidence that 
the defendant’s genome harbors 
a variant linked to poor impulse 
control. These cases are particularly 
notable in light of recent empirical 
work showing that presenting fMRI 
and genetic evidence to U.S. state 
judges during the penalty phase of 
a hypothetical murder trial led to 
lower sentences for the defendant 
[14]. Such findings are consistent 
with the idea that biological evidence 
of reduced self-control capacity 
can mitigate culpability for criminal 
defendants. A second context in 
which the neuroscience of self-
control has become relevant to the 
law is in the area of juvenile justice 
policy [15]. In the last ten years, three 
landmark Supreme Court decisions 
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Figure 2. The lingua franca problem. 
Legal concepts that explicitly reference mind and behavior have no clear mapping to the cog-
nitive processes and paradigms recognized by science. Boxes (top) depict several legal stand-
ards that incorporate assessment of mental function. Pyramids show three legally-relevant 
domains of cognition, with domain-specific cognitive processes identified underneath. Experi-
mental paradigms (bottom) are grouped according to the domain of cognition that they access 
and the domain-specific processes that each measures.eliminated the death sentence for 
minors (Roper v. Simmons) [16], found 
that sentences of life without parole 
for minors convicted of non-homicide 
offenses were unconstitutional 
(Graham v. Florida) [17], and abolished 
mandatory life without parole 
sentences for all minors, irrespective 
of their crime (Miller v. Alabama) [18]. 
In these cases, developmental 
neuroscience data were used to argue 
that adolescent criminal defendants 
are less capable of self-control by 
virtue of their relatively immature 
brains, and therefore less culpable. 
Prediction
The criminal justice system is 
charged not only with sanctioning 
past offenses, but also with 
preventing future ones. Though 
the prospective function of the 
courts is less immediately obvious, 
it is no less essential than its 
retrospective role. This point was 
made plainly by the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s statement in Simmons v. 
South Carolina that “a defendant’s 
future dangerousness bears on all 
sentencing determinations made 
in our criminal justice system” 
[19]. The predictive duties of 
the court are most apparent in 
probation, parole, pretrial detention, 
sentencing and civil commitment 
hearings. Historically, clinical 
evaluation was considered to be 
the gold standard for determining 
the ‘future dangerousness’ of 
an offender. However, such 
assessments have been strongly 
criticized as unstructured and 
subjective, and empirical data do 
not support either their reliability or 
predictive validity [20]. 
In response to the problems 
associated with clinical prediction, 
scholars in this area have developed 
a more rigorously quantitative 
approach. These ‘actuarial’ 
techniques use formulas that consider 
demographic and behavioral variables 
to place individuals into ranked risk 
categories. While significantly more 
reliable than clinical evaluation, 
actuarial prediction has faced 
opposition from mental health 
professionals and skepticism in the 
courts [20]. Actuarial prediction has 
also been criticized by scholars who 
concede that this approach is much 
better than clinical assessment, 
yet who argue that the absence of 
biological information about violence in actuarial formulae represents a 
fundamental failing. This perspective 
is grounded in two somewhat dubious 
propositions. First, that neuroscience 
“has established with sufficient 
certainty the particular areas of the 
brain that affect action relevant to 
aggression and impulse control”. 
And second, that without cognitive 
neuroscience data, “no matter how 
accurate the instrument, it will be 
impossible to predict a particular 
individual’s behavior” [21].
It is true that neuroscience has 
begun to uncover some of the 
neurobiological underpinnings 
of antisocial behavior. A modest 
number of brain imaging studies 
have reported structural and 
functional correlates of antisocial 
behavior: genetic associations 
to impulsive-aggression — most 
notably involving an upstream 
tandem repeat polymorphism in 
the monoamine oxidase A gene — 
and structural, functional and 
connectivity correlates of violence 
risk-linked variants, which account 
for a small amount of variability in 
the structure and function of brain 
circuits linked to threat response and inhibitory control [22]. The 
biological complexity of violence — 
and the correspondingly small 
effect sizes attached to individual 
causal factors — necessarily renders 
such insights preliminary [22–24]. 
However, some legal scholars 
have nevertheless contended that 
“cognitive neuroscience provides 
an objective basis upon which 
to predict future dangerousness 
and provide for the involuntary 
commitment of violent offenders 
both during and after their sentence” 
[21]. This argument is based on 
the notion that neuroscientific 
evidence could meet the “threshold 
standard for involuntary commitment 
because it can determine — with a 
reasonable degree of accuracy — 
whether a criminal defendant 
remains a threat to himself.” The 
argument that neuroscientific data 
could form a constitutionally valid 
basis for involuntary commitment 
is profoundly misguided. Indeed, it 
illustrates the perilous gap between 
how neuroscientists think about 
neuroscientific data and how some 
in the law might like to use these 
data. 
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Figure 3. The G2i problem.
Thirty subjects are asked to either lie or tell the truth about an objective fact during fMRI. Con-
trasting brain activity during the ‘lying’ versus ‘truth-telling’ conditions shows that, across all 
subjects, lying is associated with enhanced activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; 
starred region) compared to truth-telling. However, examination of individual DLPFC values in 
each condition reveals substantial inter-subject variability. Crucially, while lying is linked to in-
creased DLPFC activity on the mean, some participants show no difference between lying and 
truth-telling (subject 18; green rectangle) or higher DLPFC function during truth-telling (subject 
20; red rectangle). Relying on DLPFC activity to determine whether a defendant is lying or telling 
the truth would lead to a false negative in subject 18 and a false positive in subject 20. Inferential challenges for 
neuroscience in the courts
The lingua franca problem
Translational issues impose significant 
barriers to the valid integration 
of scientific data in the courts. 
Neuroscientific data are being 
brought into the courts because 
many legal rules explicitly consider 
aspects of mind and mental function. 
Yet, most legal rules that reference 
the mind are underspecified to a 
degree that confounds appropriate 
operationalization by scientists. 
To a cognitive neuroscientist, legal 
standards like ‘volitional capacity’ and 
‘irresistible impulse’ are inherently 
meaningless. They do not map on 
to specific mental processes or 
discrete brain circuits. In other words, 
legal rules that hinge on judgments 
about the human mind do not 
actually reference any of the valid 
species of human mental function 
that cognitive science has labored to catalog. Conversely, cognitive 
science constructs such as ‘action 
cancellation’ or ‘delayed reward 
discounting’ represent valid and 
distinct species of cognition that can 
be measured reliably and precisely, yet 
are foreign to legal decision-makers. 
There is no coherent framework for 
linking legal standards referencing 
mental function to specific, 
quantifiable cognitive processes. 
Neuroscience and law lack a ‘lingua 
franca’ of cognition that could bridge 
the conceptual chasm that exists 
between these disciplines. So when 
law invites or allows the introduction 
of neuroscience evidence to assess 
an individual’s ‘blameworthiness.’ 
‘volitional capacity’, or ‘pain and 
suffering’, there is no principled way 
of deciding what exactly should or 
should not be measured (Figure 2).
Consider a case in which a 
neuroscientist is asked to testify 
about a defendant’s ability to exercise self-control at the time of his alleged 
offense. This question will likely 
reference one or more specific legal 
doctrines germane to the issue. In 
the domain of self-control, some 
of the relevant doctrines require a 
determination of the defendant’s 
capacity to: conform behavior to the 
requirements of the law, know or 
appreciate whether conduct is wrong, 
control complex bodily functioning, 
premeditate, maintain composure 
when provoked or in other states of 
extreme mental or emotional stress 
and contemplate the consequences of 
his or her actions. These are normative 
concepts that have no inherent 
relationship to operationalizable 
cognitive processes. Thus, any 
attempt to measure them scientifically 
will be, at best, a good-faith guess, 
and at worst a very costly form of 
interdisciplinary charades. As long as 
legal concepts that invoke aspects 
of mental function remain cognitively 
underspecified to a degree that 
prevents appropriate operationalization 
by scientists, the evidentiary value of 
neuroscientific data will be limited.
The G2i problem 
The group-to-individual (G2i) problem 
has its roots in a core difference 
between the aim and methods of 
science, and the goals of the legal 
system. Science is focused on 
understanding universal phenomena. 
Groups of individuals are studied with 
the aim of making inferences that can 
be generalized to the population from 
which these individuals are drawn. 
By contrast, the goal of a trial court 
is to make determinations about 
individuals. Courts often attempt to 
use science’s general knowledge of 
a phenomenon to make individual-
level inferences [25,26]. As Faigman 
has put it, “While science attempts to 
discover the universals hiding among 
the particulars, trial courts attempt 
to discover the particulars hiding 
among the universals” [25]. However, 
science’s generalized, population-
level knowledge of a phenomenon 
does not necessarily provide an 
appropriate empirical foundation 
for making inferences about the 
instantiation of that phenomenon in 
any given individual.  
Consider an fMRI experiment in 
which 30 subjects were instructed 
to tell the truth about a set of facts 
in one condition, and to lie about 
that set of facts in another. The 
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Figure 4. A process model for evaluating 
neuroscientific evidence.
The first two steps involve clarifying which 
legal standards or concepts incorporate de-
terminations about mind and brain. They spe-
cifically articulate how neuroscience could be 
useful for making these determinations. In ad-
dition, these steps would demarcate stand-
ards that appear to reference mind and brain, 
but for which there is legal consensus that 
neuroscientific evidence is neither desired 
nor required for adjudication. The third step 
describes an iterative ‘conversation’ between 
neuroscience and law to determine how to 
best to operationalize legal standards that 
reference mental function. In the final steps, 
neuroscience assesses the scientific validity 
and incremental value of ‘legally meaningful’ experimenters, as is typical, use 
a mixed-effects model to contrast 
fMRI blood-oxygen-level dependent 
(BOLD) response amplitude between 
the two conditions, first within each 
subject and then between all subjects, 
treating subject as a random factor. 
After appropriate correction for 
multiple comparisons, their statistical 
parametric map reveals several brain 
regions (including the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex; DLPFC) that show 
higher amplitude responses to lying as 
compared to truth-telling. 
Of course, if the experimenters 
were to plot peak DLPFC BOLD 
responses across all subjects, they 
would find that lying-related DLPFC 
recruitment differs dramatically 
across the sample. Some participants 
show very strong DLPFC activity 
during lying, others do not show 
any difference, and a few subjects 
have the opposite pattern entirely — 
increased DLPFC BOLD responses 
to truth-telling compared to lying. 
However, despite pronounced 
variation between individuals, the size 
of the effect is large enough, relative 
to the variance between subjects, to 
reject the null hypothesis. Because 
each subject is treated as though 
they were drawn at random from the 
population of all potential subjects, 
the statistical analysis permits formal 
inference about the stereotypical or 
‘universal’ effect of the experimental 
manipulation. So far, this experiment 
is pretty standard cognitive 
neuroscience. What then, limits its 
applicability to the courts? 
In truth, there are several problems 
with fMRI lie detection, including 
issues related to construct and 
content validity, ecological validity, 
and reverse inference, and these have 
been the subject of excellent analyses 
elsewhere [27]. For the purpose of 
this discussion, the fMRI lie-detection 
experiment nicely illustrates the G2i 
problem. If group-level brain imaging 
studies indicate that a particular brain 
region or brain network is activated 
during an experimental task that 
purports to access some legally-
relevant dimension of cognition, 
it is presumed that measuring an 
individual’s fMRI signal in that region 
or network provides an objective 
marker of that cognitive capacity in 
that individual. However, translating 
group-level scientific findings into 
information that is useful for an 
individual legal actor is far from straightforward, and we have argued 
previously that ‘individualizing’ 
neuroscience data in the courts 
via G2i inference is fundamentally 
unsound [26].
Based on the hypothetical study 
described above, courts might 
be tempted to treat DLPFC as an 
individual-level biomarker for lying. 
However, even a cursory glance at 
the individual DLPFC BOLD signal 
values from this experiment should 
fatally undermine this presumption 
(Figure 3). The experimenters’ analysis 
showing that DLPFC is more active 
on the mean during lying obscures 
the fact that some individuals showed 
no increase in DLPFC activation 
during lying and still others showed 
increased DLPFC activity during 
truth-telling. If the defendant fell into 
either of the latter two categories, 
individual measurement of DLPFC 
during fMRI lie-detection would be 
highly misleading. In the first case, 
the defendant’s lie would not be 
detected. In the second case, the 
court might infer that the defendant 
was lying when in fact they were not. 
The G2i problem is of course not 
limited to brain-based lie-detection. 
It is a general problem that obtains 
whenever group-level data are used to 
support individual-level inferences. 
External and incremental validity
Legal policy must account for the fact 
that neuroscience evidence may not 
generalize across different settings. 
Concern here arises out of potential 
interpretational biases inherent to, 
for example, brain imaging. While 
the law may be sensitive to issues 
of external validity with behavioral 
measures, the sense that measuring 
the brain reveals something ‘hard-
wired’ and unchangeable may blind 
legal decision-makers to this issue. 
It would be an error to presume that 
a neuroscientific measure of some 
mental process is a reliable proxy 
for measuring the operation of that 
process in the ‘real world’. Though 
the use of neuroscience in the courts 
often rests on the presumption that 
behavior measured in the laboratory 
tracks behavior in the real world, 
we still know relatively little about 
the conditions under which this 
assumption is valid.
It is often assumed that 
neuroscientific measures of cognition 
provide higher fidelity insight into our 
mental states and intrinsic capacities, relative to behavioral and self-report 
measures. This assumption drives 
much of the enthusiasm around 
‘neuroprediction’ [21].However, at 
least in the domain of prediction, 
evidence of incremental validity 
for neuroscientific data is sparse. 
Given the expense and potentially 
prejudicial nature of neuroscientific 
evidence [9], rigorous evaluation 
of the incremental validity of 
neuroscientific data over and above 
mere behavior is needed. To date, 
we know of only one such study that 
assessed the increased predictive 
power of fMRI for a legally-relevant 
behavior [28]. Using a prospective 
design in a sample of incarcerated 
offenders, the authors found that an 
fMRI BOLD signal measure did appear 
to provide better predictive power 
for recidivism than behavior alone. 
However, the effect was only found for 
non-violent offenders; the predictive 
power of fMRI was not compared to 
actuarial measures; and the relative 
neuroscientific evidence.
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due to the brain-imaging variable 
was modest. Nevertheless, this study 
exemplifies a useful approach to 
testing the incremental validity of 
neuroscientific evidence. 
Can bad science make for good 
evidence?
Some legal scholars have argued that 
the challenges we outline above are 
overblown, or in any case irrelevant 
to the administration of law. As this 
argument goes, even given these 
confounds neuroscientific evidence 
is likely to be better — or at least, 
no worse — than the status quo. 
Though neuroscience evidence is not 
“perfect”, a ‘little bit’ of reliability and 
validity is be better than nothing, and 
thus there might be circumstances in 
which ‘bad science’ could be ‘good 
evidence’. For example, Schauer 
claims that “because law’s goals and 
norms differ from those of science, 
there is no more reason to impose 
the standards of science on law than 
to impose the standards of law on 
science” [29].
We categorically reject this 
argument. Bad science cannot make 
for good law any more than good 
tarot card reading could make for 
good law. When scientists talk about 
bad science, we mean that a study, 
approach, or technique is inferentially 
compromised. When an experimental 
effect has an associated p-value of 
0.2, this does not mean that it’s 80% 
trustworthy. It isn’t ‘more trustworthy’ 
than an effect with a p-value of 0.5, it 
is simply untrustworthy. Thus, when 
scientists label brain-based lie-
detection as ‘bad science’ because 
of fatal issues with reliability and 
validity, they mean that they don’t 
trust the ability of that method to 
measure the phenomenon of interest. 
In that instance, the scientists are 
not saying that they don’t trust it 
as much as a better approach to 
lie-detection but more than tarot-
card reading. They are declaring 
the method to be epistemologically 
bankrupt. 
A response to this argument is that 
the question of when science is good 
enough for the courts is ultimately 
a normative and institutional one, 
and therefore the exclusive purview 
of law rather than science [29]. 
While true in a narrow sense, this 
position poses a serious threat to the 
legitimacy of scientific evidence. If the law permits scientific evidence 
to be introduced in the courts but 
refuses to be constrained by the 
limitations of scientific inference, it is 
saying that it is not really interested 
in science at all. This approach 
threatens to turn science into an 
empirical fig-leaf: something used to 
cover the law’s anxieties about the 
uncertainty inherent in evaluating 
human minds — and its insecurities 
about relying on its own normative 
preferences and precedents — but 
fundamentally insubstantial. In 
fact, we argue that bad science is 
actually worse than no science, 
because it gives the false appearance 
of rigor and certainty. The lingua 
franca and G2i problems represent 
profound threshold challenges to 
the valid use of neuroscience in the 
courts. Rather than make do with 
inferentially compromised science, 
we argue for an empirically driven 
policy framework that can help guide 
decisions about whether, how, and 
when cognitive and neuroscientific 
data can be used to make legal 
judgments about individual 
defendants. 
Where do we go from here?
We call for the development of a 
neuro-legal lingua franca to facilitate 
objective classification of legal 
standards according to scientifically 
meaningful criteria. Ultimately, only 
legal policymakers can make the 
value judgments on which policy 
is based. However, legal rules that 
involve the human mind and mental 
function should include quantifiable 
and testable concepts of mind and 
brain. Development of this lingua 
franca should involve determining 
which experimental paradigms 
provide the best fit for specific legal 
standards. Furthermore, it should 
explicitly identify legal standards 
for which the law indicates that it 
neither desires nor requires scientific 
evidence to adjudicate. This common 
conceptual language would allow 
scientists understand a priori that 
a given experimental manipulation 
or measurement does, does not, 
or cannot, access a specific legal 
concept, and will facilitate the 
translation (i.e. operationalization) of 
legal concepts with greater fidelity. 
If the law intends to permit the use 
of cognitive and neuroscientific 
evidence to make inferences about 
legally germane aspects of mind and brain, legal policymakers must 
work with scientists to ensure that 
legally meaningful judgments arising 
from scientific data are, in fact, 
scientifically valid. 
Second, we need a strong 
empirical foundation for tackling 
the G2i problem. This would 
require extensive knowledge of 
the distribution of legally relevant 
cognitive processes in large, 
representative samples. While 
the law sorts people into discrete 
cognitive taxa (e.g. competent vs. 
not-competent; responsible vs. 
not-responsible) inter-individual 
differences in mental functioning 
are in fact more dimensional than 
categorical. Despite our increasing 
general understanding of legally 
relevant mental phenomena, 
meaningful individual-level inferences 
are largely precluded by the 
absence of large, demographically 
representative datasets that could 
elucidate the population distribution 
of the many cognitive capacities 
that courts might consider pertinent 
to legal judgments. Individual 
measurements of cognition 
and behavior, neuroscientific or 
otherwise, are only meaningful in 
reference to such distributions. 
Without these large-scale population 
norms, even experimental tasks with 
high reliability and validity would 
be unsuitable for individual-level 
inference of the kind that is required 
in courtroom settings. Of course, 
even assuming that science could 
quantify where in the population 
distribution a given individual falls 
with respect to a specific legally-
relevant mental function, determining 
when a person crosses the threshold 
into abnormality is entirely a 
normative question and outside the 
purview of science. 
We believe that neuroscience can 
and should be used to enhance the 
fairness and efficiency of the legal 
system. However, the promise of 
neuroscience with respect to the law 
can only ever be fulfilled if we clearly 
identify and resolve the significant 
inferential issues that lie at the 
intersection of these two disciplines. 
This will require a coordinated, 
proactive, interdisciplinary effort 
that engages scientists, clinicians, 
jurists, legal scholars and lawmakers 
to devise a principled approach to 
integrating neuroscientific evidence 
into legal practice (Figure 4). 
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specific legal concepts and standards 
that are either incommensurable 
with neuroscience, or for which the 
law indicates that neuroscientific 
evidence is unnecessary or 
unwanted. The law is not compelled 
to use neuroscientific evidence to 
render its decisions; judgments 
made on the basis of moral intuition, 
normative preference, or institutional 
precedent do not require the consult 
of neuroscientist. However, the use 
of neuroscientific evidence to make 
legal determinations about minds and 
brains should be constrained by the 
limits of scientific inference. Good 
law cannot follow from bad, or badly 
used, science. 
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economics
Colin F. Camerer
Behavioral economics uses evidence 
from psychology and other social 
sciences to create a precise and 
fruitful alternative to traditional 
economic theories, which are 
based on optimization. Behavioral 
economics may interest some 
biologists, as it shifts the basis 
for theories of economic choice 
away from logical calculation and 
maximization and toward biologically 
plausible mechanisms.
Before this behavioral shift, 
economic theories assumed that 
agents have subjective numerical 
utilities for bundles of goods and 
services. Optimizing agents choose 
the utility-maximizing bundle given 
constraints determined by prices, 
available information and income. 
This ‘constrained optimization’ 
approach was never intended 
to be a realistic model of human 
cognition. Instead, the guess was 
that predictions based on the 
optimization model — such as how 
people respond to a change in the 
tax on alcohol — would be roughly 
accurate, perhaps after some period 
of adjustment to the change. 
The behavioral-economics 
alternative adds limits to 
computational ability, willpower 
and selfishness to the historical 
optimization approach. Knowledge of 
these limits comes from psychology 
and, more recently, neuroscience. In 
this general behavioral view, prices, 
income and information certainly 
affect behavior. However, the way 
in which information is processed 
to make choices can be described 
by psychological principles that 
often are not statistically optimal. 
Other psychological factors, such 
as how choices are described (or, 
equivalently, framed) and attended 
to, can affect economic behavior 
as well.
Behavioral economics is especially 
useful when decisions are complex 
and optimality is difficult to achieve. 
These decisions include some of the 
most important choices people make, 
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